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Despite the huge amount of wealth in the hand of Muslims, most countries with 
Muslim majority population fall in the category of developing nations. The 
development of infrastructure has been proven to be an effective means for 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Usually governments have recourse to 
conventional debt financing to undertake infrastructure projects. However, this 
form of financing is unsuitable in an Islamic framework due to the prohibition of 
interest. Moreover, the recurrent sovereign debt crises over the last few decades 
stresses the importance of debt management that helps avoid the high costs of 
these forms of catastrophe. Debt indexation to some indicators from the real 
economy (like GDP or Commodity price) has been identified as an effective 
means for the reduction of sovereign default. Such an idea has the property of 
strengthening the linkage between the real and the financial sectors of the 
economy and allows risk sharing between the parties involved in the transaction. 
In spite of the convergence of such an idea with the spirit of Islamic finance, the 
Sukūk market has not yet taken advantage of it. The objective of this paper is, 
therefore, to propose an innovative model of Sukūk for financing non revenue 
generating public sector projects whose return is linked to the GDP development 
of the issuing country. The paper examines the potential benefits and obstacles of 
the GDP-Linked Sukūk (GLS) model, which is based on Forward Ijārah, as well 
as its risk-return profile. Furthermore, a framework for pricing GLS is put forth. 
Based on a sample of countries from five regions of the Muslim world, the 
theoretical properties of the GLS are validated through backtesting method. The 
model is shown to be a new asset class between the traditional debt and equity 
instruments and offers interesting diversification opportunities. Besides its 
theoretical contribution, the model proposed in this paper addresses in an 
effective way the issue of debt management, in an interest-free context, and the 
issue of benchmarking sovereign Sukūk against the interest rate. 
Key Words: GDP-Linked Sukūk, Forward Ijārah, Backtesting. 
1. Introduction 
Despite the huge amount of wealth in the hand of Muslims, most countries with Muslim majority 
population fall in the category of developing nations. The development of infrastructure has been 
proven to be an effective means for economic progress (Estache and Fay 2007). Thus, it has been 
shown that the quantity and quality of the infrastructure have a positive impact on economic 
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growth and are negatively correlated to income inequality. As an implication, the development of 
infrastructure is seen to be an effective way to combat poverty (Calderon and Serven 2004). 
Usually governments have recourse to conventional debt financing to undertake infrastructure 
projects. However, this mode of financing is unsuitable in an Islamic framework due to the 
prohibition of interest.  
Over the last decade, Sukūk (sing. Sakk) have been seen as an alternative to interest-based 
financing, in the Islamic capital market. Sukūk represent proportionate beneficial ownership of an 
asset or a pool of assets for a defined period when the risk and return associated with the cash 
flows generated by the underlying assets are passed to the Sukūk holders (Iqbal and Mirakhor 
2007, p.177). The euphoria which accompanied the phenomenal growth of the Sukūk market 
over the recent years is, however, tarnished by various criticisms raised about the Sharī’ah 
compliance and /or the economic efficiency of many of the current Sukūk structures. This led to 
the famous AAOIFI‟s statement in 2008.  
On the other hand, the recurrent sovereign debt crises during the last few decades stresses 
the importance of debt management that helps avoids the high costs of these forms of 
catastrophe. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) document short-lived but significant sovereign 
default costs which can take various forms. Thus, in addition to its negative effect on GDP 
growth, sovereign default is shown to cause reputational costs
4
, international trade exclusion 
costs
5
, costs to the domestic financial system
6
 and political costs to the authorities. 
 Debt indexation to some indicators from the real economy (like GDP or Commodity 
price) has been identified as an effective means for the reduction of sovereign default. Despite 
the potential benefits of indexed-bonds, acknowledged in the literature, little work is done to 
investigate their adaptability in the context of Islamic finance. The objective of this paper is, 
therefore, to show the pertinence of this indexation within the framework of Islamic finance and 
to propose a design of GDP-Linked Sukūk. To this end, the next section will be devoted to a 
review of selected literature pertaining to the potentials of Sukūk for the public sector and some 
relevant issues. The second part of this review investigates the potential benefits and 
shortcomings of GDP-Linked bonds and examines the possibility of their adoption in the Islamic 
finance industry. Section 3 is concerned with the design, the pricing and the Sharī’ah 
justification of GDP-Linked Sukūk. The theoretical characteristics of this model of Sukūk will be 
tested empirically using backtest method in section 4. The conclusion will end the paper. 
  
                                                          
4
 Reputational costs can be in the form of full exclusion from capital market and credit rating downgrade that will 
result in higher borrowing costs later. 
5
 International trading costs could be in the form of net decrease of bilateral trade and decline of of the trade 
credit of the defaulted country. 
6
 This can take the form of an increase of the probability of banking crisis. (See Borensztein and Panizza, 2009, for 
more elaboration). 
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2. Literature review 
The principal message of this section is to point out to the potentials of the Sukūk for the public sector and 
to discuss the issues that could impede their realization. We have argued that to address these issues and 
take full advantage of the potential benefit we need to be innovative. Wisdom can be taken from 
anywhere, and conventional finance has some good aspects that can be useful to Islamic finance. 
In this regard, the idea of GDP-linked bond is explored. This idea presents opportunities for risk 
sharing and for integrating the financial sector to the real sector of the economy. Both of them fit 
well to the principles of Islamic finance. 
2.1. Sukūk: Potentials for the public sector and issues 
 
2.1.1. Potentials of Sukūk for the Public Sector  
As developing countries, Muslim nations have a large demand for infrastructure projects, such as 
schools, hospitals, roads, water, electricity etc. However, in most cases the governments in the 
developing countries do not have sufficient revenues to fund these types of projects which are 
vital for sustainable development. To meet this form of demand, Iqbal and Khan (2004) suggest 
the utilization of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and its variants along with the Sukūk structures 
as a better alternative to the conventional financing which is based on interest. The reason for 
that is, at least, twofold: first, given that Sukūk and Islamic financing in general are based on real 
assets, they are expected to enhance the stability of the financial institutions and markets. This 
feature ensures a stronger connection between the financial sector and the real sector of the 
economy and renders the system less prone to speculative activities which are the cause of many 
crises. Second, such a policy consisting of financing government expenditure through Islamic 
financial instruments is expected to discipline public expenditure as availability of finance 
without an asset will be very limited. As a result, greater prudence will be introduced in the 
overall macroeconomic management as well as in the efficiency of microeconomic units 
operating in an economy. 
Indeed, Sukūk have already been used as a tool for macroeconomic management in some 
Muslim countries. Referring to the Sudanese experience, Eltegani (2005) mentions that Sukūk 
can be used by governments as well as the Central banks for monetary policy and for liquidity 
control. Thus, when Sukūk are sold to the public money is withdrawn from the market, and this 
has its effect on money supply. Money withdrawn will be kept by the Central Bank. On the other 
hand, when need arises such money or part of it will be poured again into the market by buying 
Sukūk. 
In addition to its function as tool for macroeconomic policy, Sukūk is, thus, claimed to 
enhance the efficiency of the financial system, through the linkage of credit supply with real 
asset (Siddiqi 2006) and improve the equity within the system by allowing many small savers to 
invest and benefit from the true profits resulting from investments that conform with Sharī’ah 
principles (Usmani 2007). However, many writers have questioned the validity of such claims 
based on the current practice in the Sukūk market. The issues raised against many of the Sukūk 
structures relate to different aspects encompassing Sharī’ah compliance, economics, regulatory 
and legal framework. Here we shall focus on the Sharī’ah compliance and the economic aspects 
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only as the legal and the regulatory aspects may be too variable from a jurisdiction to another 
and from a period to another.  
2.1.2. Sharī’ah issues 
Oh et al. (2009) discuss two forms of product efficiency: the technical efficiency and the 
allocative efficiency. In the price-quality space, a product is technically efficient if it has higher 
quality for lower price.  However, an efficient product may not be selected by consumers, even 
when it has the highest quality and lowest price. The reason is not the absolute level of quality, 
but the mix of qualities which does not match the consumer‟s preference structure. The 
allocative efficiency refers to the degree of match of quality mix with the preference structure. 
Adopting these definitions and applying them to financial product, we can say that a Sukūk 
product is technically efficient if it provides higher return compared to other financial 
instruments with the same level of risk. Furthermore, we consider that tradability in addition to 
Sharī’ah compliance are essential constituents of the 'allocative efficiency' in the Sukūk market.  
Haneef (2009) identifies three hallmarks in the development of the Sukūk. He showed that 
Sukūk evolved from asset-backed model, where the Sukūkholders have ownership rights over the 
underlying asset, as per Sharī’ah requirements, to asset-based model. With the latter model, the 
Sukūkholders rank pari passu with unsecured creditors. Indeed, for all international bonds there 
is a negative pledge which restricts the borrowing entity from issuing any bond in future that is 
not in pari passu with existing unsecured bonds. The third stage of the Sukūk structures evolution 
was marked by the emergence of models that were mainly based on partnership contracts but 
violate some of their basic Sharī’ah requirements. Those structures in particular have drawn 
various criticisms that culminate with Sheikh Taqi Usmani‟s declaration which considered that 
85% of those Sukūk were non-Sharī’ah compliant. This led the AAOIFI‟s statement in 2008.  
(Al-Amine 2008) points out to the controversy among Muslim scholars over the 
permissibility for one of the Mushārakah partners to give an undertaking to purchase the shares 
or units of other partners at predetermined price. The rationale for the objection is that the very 
nature of a Mushārakah is the sharing of profit and loss among the partners. The undertaking to 
purchase the share of a partner at predetermined price defeats that spirit of Mushārakah as one 
partner will have a guaranteed return, whatsoever is the outcome of the venture.  
The combination of many Sharī’ah endorsed contracts to produce a Sukūk structure with a 
desired cash flow is common in the current Islamic finance industry. Al-Amine (2008) analyses 
the structure of many of these combined contracts in the light of Bai’ al-Wafā, Bai’ al-Istighlal 
and Bai al-„Inah. It is found that all these transactions are controversial and accepted by only a 
minority of Muslim jurists. Those who reject them consider these forms of transaction as mere 
hiyal (legal tricks) meant to circumvent the prohibition of interest-based lending. Thus, even 
though the form may adhere to the requirements of Sharī'ah in exchange contract, the substance 
does not (Al-Zuhayli 2003; Al-Amine 2008). 
Another issue which has drawn the attention of the scholars is the third party guarantee 
present in many Sukūk structures. Al-Amine (2008) argues that theoretically, a benevolent third 
party guarantee without fee or consideration can be acceptable in Islamic law. However, in 
practice guaranteeing the principal in Sukūk Mushārakah, or Sukūk Mudhārabah or Sukūk Ijārah 
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is problematic. This is due to the fact that if the guarantee is provided by a government it shall be 
declared non-permissible to use the property of the whole community for the benefit of private 
entities. Likewise, it is hardly conceivable for a private entity to provide a benevolent guarantee 
to another entity without a consideration.  
2.1.3. Economic issues 
The discussion on the economics of Sukūk will focus on few issues, such as the efficiency, the 
tradability and the pricing mechanism of Sukūk that have drawn most attention among the 
players. Another aspect which needs consideration, in this context, is the equity and fairness of 
the transaction. This equity aspect, as reflected in the pricing mechanism, has been addressed in 
various ways in the literature. Even though all these issues have Sharī’ah dimension, here we 
will mainly focus on their economic aspects. 
Ali (2008) holds that the combined contracts, in the Sukūk structures, attempt to replicate 
conventional financial products while trying to remain within Sharī’ah bounds. The end result is 
complicated products which are hard to understand, costly to construct and implement and which 
may contradict the objectives of Sharī’ah.  
It can be argued that the complexity of a structure increases costs stemming from the need 
of more sophisticated legal documentation and more efforts for advertisement of the new strange 
product; as a result the Sukūk become less profitable either for the investors or for the issuers or 
for both which means a loss of efficiency in the technical sense.  
The tradability of some category of Sukūk, in the secondary market, is a subject of 
concern for many players in the Islamic capital markets as it constrains drastically the liquidity in 
the Sukūk market. The Sukūk structures based on sale contracts are not tradable, according to 
AAOIFI Sharī’ah Standard, as this would be tantamount to debt trading which is prohibited by 
the majority of Muslim jurists except if it is at par. However, this stance is challenged by a 
minority of scholars, particularly in Malaysia, who allow the sale of debt at discount (Rosly and 
Sanusi 1999). Their stand is based on the view of some classical jurists who allowed the sale of 
debt under some conditions. To these Malaysian scholars those conditions are met when there is 
a transparent regulatory system safeguarding the interests of the market participants. 
Furthermore, they invoke the concept of Dha’ wa ta’ajjal7 to strengthen their argument8. 
However, both arguments fail to address the main issue in the transaction which is the 
involvement of Ribā, as there is a contractual increase of the amount to be repaid later in a loan 
contract. Moreover, Maslahah is not a valid argument when the transaction in question violates a 
clear cut text. In this case the text prohibiting Ribā is decisive in nature. Similarly, the majority 
of the Muslim scholars reject the concept of Dha’ wa ta’ajjal particularly when it is a condition 
in the contract.  
The use of interest rate benchmarks such as LIBOR for pricing purposes, though not 
desirable, is deemed acceptable from a Sharī’ah perspective as long as the pillars and conditions 
                                                          
7
 The concept is referred to when a creditor forfeits a part of debt when the debtor settles the balance of the debt 
earlier than scheduled.   
8
 Syariah Advisory Council’s Resolution, accessed on 14 March 2011 at 
http://www.sc.com.my/main.asp?pageid=450&menuid=554&newsid=&linkid=&type=. 
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of the contract in question are present (Usmani 1999a). Thus, the use of these conventional 
benchmarks can be seen as a transitory step towards the establishment of a mature Islamic 
finance industry with its own benchmark. El-Gamal (2006) while recognizing the potential 
benefit of using additional benchmarks related to the underlying assets to reflect the spirit of 
Islamic commercial law, argues against the replacement of the conventional benchmarks by an 
Islamic one. He considers such a move unnecessary, impractical and dangerous. This is because 
there is no reason to be embarrassed about using the conventional benchmarks and, more 
importantly, there is a lack of depth and liquidity of homogenous Islamic financial assets. 
However, the majority of those who have written on the subject consider it aberrant to use 
a tool that Islamic finance was supposed to remove since its very beginning. Furthermore, it is 
remarked that by using money market rate as benchmark, the return to the Sukūkholders will 
reflect the prevalent rate of interest instead of the actual performance of the underlying asset of 
the Sukūk (Al-Amine 2008; Jabeen and Khan 2008; Siddiqi 2006). This could defeat what is 
thought to be one of the features of Islamic finance that is the integration of the real and the 
financial sectors. In the same vein, Siddiqi (2006) maintains that the disconnection between the 
two sectors mostly occurs with the over reliance on debt instruments as the case is in 
conventional finance, while it is admitted that the greater the role of debt the lesser will be the 
ability of the financial system to absorb real shocks. It also limits the ability of monetary 
authorities to take corrective actions because of fear of instigating widespread defaults. He 
further proposes the linking of the returns to Sukūk to the actual productivity, as with this 
arrangement justice and fairness will be ensured. The rationale is fairness requires that 
uncertainties attending upon productive enterprise be shared. At the same time, justice and 
fairness require that losses, if and when they occur due to the uncertainties in the business 
environment, be borne by those who claim the profits when there are profits.  
An analysis of all these issues shows that this incongruence observed in the Sukūk 
structures emanates from the desire to reconcile two different paradigms in financing. In the 
conventional setting, the traditional debt financing allows the issuer to get funds without getting 
rid of some of its assets. On the other side, the investors get tradable securities whose return is 
determined ex ante. With the prohibition of interest in the Islamic framework, this form of 
financing (bonds) is not acceptable. Instead, methods endorsed by Sharī’ah entail either a profit 
and loss sharing scheme or a transfer of asset with all the rights and obligations. The incongruity 
arises when the Sharī’ah contracts are combined to reproduce the substance of financial 
instrument which is repugnant to their nature and to the Islamic paradigm in finance. The 
literature that we have examined unveils that the innovation in the Sukūk market has been more 
legal than financial i.e. the forms and the legal documentations of the Sukūk may be different 
from the existing instruments; however, they are very much like the conventional debt 
instruments in term of cash flow and risk return profile and may contradict some of the principles 
of Islamic finance.  
Thus, as we have seen above, Sukūk comport numerous potential benefits. However these 
potential benefits could be hampered by the increasing controversies over the Sharī’ah 
compliance of many of the Sukūk structures in the market. These controversies affect negatively 
the allocative efficiency of the Sukūk, in the long term, as many pious Muslim investors would 
prefer to put their funds in other investment vehicles. A result of such a move would be less 
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investor base for Sukūk that leads to higher required rate of return for the funds suppliers or 
higher cost of capital for issuers translating into less efficiency in the technical sense. 
Therefore, for a sustainable growth, we argue that financial innovation is necessary as 
advocated by many Muslim economists who consider financial engineering a vital area for 
Islamic finance. In the next paragraphs we review the literature pertaining to GDP-Linked bonds, 
a concept that is of relevance to Islamic finance, as it shares some common features with it.  
2.2. GDP-Linked bonds: potential benefits, obstacles and adaptability 
In the bond pricing literature there seems to be a growing interest in indexation whereby either 
coupon or principal payment or both are linked to a given indicator such as inflation, GDP or a 
commodity price. Though the popularization of indexed bonds is quite recent, distinguished 
economists like Marshall, Irving Fisher, Keynes, Milton Friedman, have been strong proponents 
of such an instrument (Price 1997).  
A number of reasons have been put forth in favor of indexed bonds. First, GDP-linked 
bond is shown to improve debt sustainability for sovereigns in times of economic downturn and 
allows countries to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policy (Borensztein and Mauro 2004).  This is 
because GDP-linked bond matches the payment obligation to the economic performance. 
Government revenues, which are mainly constituted of tax income, increase with good economic 
performance. Thus,   with this scheme economic growth risk is shared between borrowing 
country and its creditors as the latter will receive more cash flow in times of good economic 
performance, and less when the economy is bad. Notwithstanding the higher risk that the 
creditors face with this instrument, as compared to straight bond, these indexed bonds provide 
opportunity to take advantage of the benefits of investing in growing economies. Furthermore, 
these bonds are of nature to lower the likelihood of defaults and financial crises that could result 
in costly litigation and sometimes in outright losses
9
 (Borensztein, and Mauro 2002; Miyajima 
2006; Griffith-Jones and Sharma 2006). 
Another argument in favor of indexed bond is market completeness. With the 
development of financial markets around the world, there exist many institutional investors with 
various risk appetite that would be willing to invest in these securities to diversify their 
portfolios. This is particularly relevant, if we take into consideration the fact that available 
financial instruments represent a relatively small portion of the real wealth of the nation, making, 
thus, the supply of instruments indexed to GDP an opportunities for greater diversification (Price 
1997; Schroder, Heinemann and Kruse 2004; Kamstra and Shiller 2009). 
Quite a few concerns have been raised about some potential risks to investors for the 
implementation of GDP-linked bond. These can be in the form of GDP data misreporting or 
moral hazard where the issuing country may lose incentives for promoting growth policies.  
                                                          
9
 The costs of sovereign default will not be born solely by the defaulted country and its creditors. Indeed, the 
international community will also bear its share as evidenced by the current European debt crisis whereby the 
bailout package to Greece, Ireland and Portugal advanced by IMF and EU amounts to € 110 billion,  € 85 billion, 
and € 78 billion respectively.   
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However, it is unlikely for a government to lower economic growth as the political and 
social consequences would be undesirable. On the other hand, underreporting economic growth 
would make new fund raising more costly. Thus, the parties involved in these GDP-linked bonds 
may seek the involvement of international financial institutions such as International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank to ensure the accuracy of the data (Miyajima 2006; Griffith-Jones and 
Sharma 2006).  
Although the indexed bonds constitute debt instruments with interest payments we argue 
that the rationale behind the design of these securities can be acceptable even in an Islamic 
framework. The reason for this argument can be twofold:  
First, the design of these bonds permits the integration of the real sector of the economy 
with the financial sector, since the return to the bondholders is contingent to the performance of 
some economic indicators; an element that does not necessarily exist with straight bonds.  
Second, the indexed bonds allow cooperation between the parties involved as there is 
sharing of the upsides and downsides of some real economic activities. Both elements are 
consonant to the principles of Islamic finance. Indeed, Chapra (2007) argues that risk sharing 
contributes to the promotion of justice and enhances the stability of the financial system; thus, 
benefits from the transactions are potentially fairly distributed and the burden of losses is not 
shifted to only one party. Furthermore, Mirakhor and Zaidi (2007) point out the role of risk 
sharing in establishing a strong link between the financial sector and the real sector, an aspect 
that is missing in the interest–based financial system. 
Besides the above mentioned benefits, the Islamic finance industry can take advantage of 
this innovative pricing mechanism, as a second best solution, to address one of major criticism 
against Sukūk Ijārah that is the benchmarking against interest rate.  
Wilson (2008) simulated the pricing of Sukūk Ijārah based on GDP, for 2 countries, and 
compared it with the pricing based on interest rate benchmark. Wilson's results are inconclusive 
as the returns to investors would have been more stable had Saudi Arabia priced the Sovereign 
Sukūk based on non-oil GDP. For the other country, Malaysia, the opposite would be true. 
However, Wilson's study has several limitations. First, his sample is too small (only 2 countries). 
His time frame (seven years) does not allow the assessment of the performance of Sukūk over a 
whole economic cycle. Thus, the period he considered does not cover any major economic crisis 
that would help assess the effectiveness of the model as per its declared rationale.  
The above review shows that despite the potential benefits of GDP-Linked Security that are 
acknowledged within the context of Islamic economics, very little works are undertaken to 
investigate their adaptability. This study aims at filling that gap by proposing an innovative 
model of Sukūk to raise fund for non revenue generating public sector projects which, at the 
same time, could help for a better management of sovereign debt.  
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3. GDP-linked Sukūk: Theoretical analysis 
The theoretical analysis of the GDP-Linked Sukūk comprises two main phases: The economics 
of the model and its justification from Sharī’ah perspective. 
3.1. The economics and mathematical formulation 
The literature reviewed in the previous section presented some of the potential benefits and 
obstacles to a successful introduction of GDP-Linked bonds. Thus, in this sub-section other 
aspects of these instruments pertaining to risk and return are discussed. The discussion will 
concern particularly, the design and the pricing. The design is done to reflect the desired risk 
return profile, whereas the discussion on the pricing is meant to provide a framework for their 
valuation in the secondary market.  
  The importance of this step lies in the fact that risk and return are key element for both 
investors and issuers. Investors look for assets that provide good return or offer diversification 
opportunities when included in their portfolio. On the other hand, the main objective of an issuer 
is to get stable funding at lower cost (Kamstra and Shiller 2009). Satisfying the needs of these 
two parties is not necessarily an easy task. Unless the model is attractive, economically speaking, 
to the parties involved, it does not have any chance to be successful.  
3.1.1. The design of the model 
Schroder et al. (2004) identified various indexations of GDP-Linked bonds. On the one hand, the 
instrument can be in the form of a forward on the economic performance of the issuing country, 
whereby the investors will share both upside and downside of the GDP development. The 
indexation can also be in the form of options whereby a ceiling or a floor is applied to the 
payment obligations. On the other hand, the coupon and/or the principal can be linked to the 
development of the GDP over the period of the contract. Schroder et al. (2004) found that for 
short period (e.g. 3 years) the linkage of both coupon and capital could be suitable; however, for 
longer period the indexation of coupon is preferable for otherwise there could be a big 
divergence between the face value and the redemption value.  
Besides the above forms of GDP indexation, Kamstra and Shiller (2009) suggest another 
form, very much similar to a company share, which would be long term in maturity or even 
perpetual. The instruments thus, designed would pay annually a fraction of the „earnings‟ (i.e. 
GDP) of the issuing country to investors as dividend
10
. 
The indexation method chosen for GDP-Linked Sukūk (GLS, thereafter) in this study 
consists of linking the profit portion to the GDP development of the issuing country. Such an 
indexation takes into account the findings of Schroder et al. (2004) and confines the Sukūk model 
into less risky asset classes that fit the needs of some specific types of investors. 
                                                          
10
 The authors named this new instrument „Trill‟ referring to the value of the annual dividend payment which would 
be one – trillionth of the US GDP. 
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We assume that the GLS is issued in US dollars. This is consistent with the finding of 
Ruban et al. (2008), suggesting that issuance in local currency is much more expensive than in 
foreign currency
11
.   
The flow of the transaction can be briefly described as follows:  
A country plans to build a non revenue generating project that requires a capital K. The 
required fund can be raised in a Sharī’ah compliant way, through the issuance of GLS. The two 
counterparts in the contracts (i.e. the government and the Sukukholders) agree to link the return 
to the GDP development of the country, with initial profit rate of     . For the simplicity of the 
analysis, an annual periodic payment of the profit is assumed. For a given year k, the profit rate 
     is variable, and depends on the GDP development (i.e. the country economic 
performance) and on the GDP growth rate chosen as baseline.    
With this background information, the Annual Return in year k (AR
k
) on the GLS can be 
written as follows: 
                                          
And   
   
  
  
                                                       
Where: 
-     is the initial rate of profit agreed upon by the parties at the beginning of the 
contract.  
-      is the rate of return at the kth   year, after issuance. 
-    is the growth rate of the GDP agreed upon by the contracting parties as baseline in 
year 0, i.e. at the beginning of the contract. 
-    is the growth rate of the GDP at year k. 
-    is an index that measures an increase or a decrease of the growth rate of the GDP in 
year k, as compared to that of the baseline. 
It may happen that the issuing country experiences a negative growth rate; in that case    will be 
negative which would result in a negative payment. To avoid such a scenario, the contracting 
parties may agree on a minimum rate to be paid if the growth is to be negative. In this study the 
minimum rate is assumed to be 0.  With this additional condition, equation (1) becomes: 
                                                                              
                                                          
11
 It is worth mentioning that other authors (e.g. Costa, et al. (2008)) are of different view as they consider that 
external liabilities denominated in foreign currency played a central role in many emerging countries crises.   
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It is clear that the minimum return of 0 is just for the purpose of the simulation to see the extreme 
cases as it would not be fair to the Sukūkholders whose money would have already been put for 
good use regardless of the economic situation of the issuing country. 
Two cash flow structures for the GLS are possible: 
- The principal K is divided into n equal shares and paid along with the annual profit over 
the tenor. In this case, the Sukūkholders receive, in year k, an Annual Payment APk of: 
 
     
 
 
           
 
 
                    
 
- The principal K is paid at maturity in year n, and every year only the profit portion is 
paid: 
 
                                                      
 
 The payment can be annual or semi-annual as agreed upon by the parties. The amount to be paid 
is calculated based on the GDP figure of the previous year or half a year.  
With this design, the profit rate is variable, as the case would be if the returns to the Sukūk 
were linked to another indicator like LIBOR and the principal is protected. Thus, the GLS 
provides an avenue for addressing the issue of benchmarking the return on some Sharī’ah 
compliant financial instruments against interest rate. 
3.1.2. Pricing the GLS 
The assumption made for this valuation as well as for the simulations is that the investors have 
long term horizon and their intention is to „buy-and-hold‟ the Sukūk. They liquidate their position 
only when some unforeseen circumstances force them to do so. This assumption, which is 
consistent with the prevalent behavior in the Sukūk market, implies that only the future cash 
flows, in the form of periodic profit and principal payment at maturity, matter for the 
Sukūkholders. It has the advantage of isolating the negative impact that speculators would have 
on the Sukūk price, meaning that only the real performance of the economy imports for the yield. 
The assumption is theoretically well grounded. The prominent economist Keynes (1936) 
severely charged the speculative activities which consist of forecasting the psychology of the 
market that he distinguished from enterprise, defined as the activity of forecasting the 
prospective yield of assets over their whole life. He further maintained that: 
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the 
position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. 
When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a 
casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.” (Keynes 1936; pp. 102-106).  
With this in mind, the valuation of the GLS, in the secondary markets, at any point of time 
before maturity follows the same logic as the valuation of bonds (and other financial 
instruments) which consists of calculating the present value of future cash flows.  
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To simplify the discussion, we consider the second scenario presented above whereby the 
periodic payment is constituted of only the profit portion     while the principal K will be paid 
at maturity. The price of GLS at any point of time before maturity is given by:  
    
   
      
 
   
 
 
      
                                           
Where: 
PV = the present value of GLS; 
n = the number of periods (e.g. years) from the date of valuation to the maturity date; 
   = the cash flow at period “ k ” which represents the value of the share of profit at that 
period.     is obtained based on equation (5). 
K = is the principal that the Sukūkholders disbursed for the development of the project. 
r = is the required rate of return to the Sukūkholders. 
There are two unknowns that need to be estimated for the determination of PV, i.e. the 
fair price of GLS: the periodic cash flow     and the required rate of return r. It is worth 
remarking that the required rate of return is positively related to the uncertainty or risk associated 
with      Therefore, the key point in the pricing exercise resides in the accurate estimation of 
the risk associated to     which depends on the economic performance of the issuing country 
in year k. 
According to Costa et al. (2008), who studied price behavior of the Argentina-Indexed 
Warrant, after its successful introduction to the market, the yield at which these new instruments 
were implicitly discounted can be broken down in three components: (1) the risk free rate which 
represents an opportunity cost, (2) a default premium, (3) a residual premium, identified as 
novelty premium. For the GLS, all these components would be relevant beside the economic 
growth risk premium that would compensate the investors for bearing the country growth risk. 
An issue that may arise is the determination of a proxy for the risk free rate knowing that 
in an Islamic finance framework interest is banned and any gain should be associated with risk as 
stipulated by the famous legal maxim „al ghunm bil ghurm’.  However, for the simplicity of the 
analysis, we consider the return on Mudhārabah deposits as proxy for opportunity cost. 
Mudhārabah deposit carries, in practice, a return similar to conventional fixed deposits, although 
they are very different in theory (Rosly and Zaini 2008; Diaw and Mbow, 2011). Hence, the risk 
free rate component, which is a proxy for opportunity cost, would be replaced by the return to 
Mudhārabah deposits, assuming that the Sukūkholders would be able to put their money in a 
Mudhārabah account if they wish. 
The Sukūkholders will be exposed to the default risk. However, the risk would be lower 
compared to the credit risk carried by a plain vanilla bond or a Sukūk linked to a variable interest 
rate benchmark. This stems from the construction of the GLS which matches the payment 
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obligations to the payment ability. When the GDP growth is low, government revenues 
proportionally decline but the payment to the Sukūkholders declines too. This feature makes the 
probability of default for GLS lower than the conventional bond and it is translated into a lower 
default premium (Ruban et al. 2008). 
Growth risk is another element that needs to be accounted for the determination of the 
discount rate for the GLS  As indicated by equation (1),        is a function of       and    . 
The latter variable depends on the baseline growth rate and the rate of growth in year k. While 
   is a matter of agreement between the parties,    is rather determined by the economic 
conditions of the issuing country, and it represents the key variable meant to capture the 
economic rationale of GLS. This is because the Annual Return will vary in function of the 
variations of   .  
Lastly, Costa et al. (2008) show that investors require a premium for new financial 
instrument termed as novelty premium. The findings of the authors, nonetheless, suggest that 
this type of premium is likely to decay fast over time, as the market participants became familiar 
to the instrument. This is confirmed by the results of the study carried out by Borensztein and 
Mauro (2004) as well as that of Kamstra and Shiller (2009) who found that the premium would 
be relatively small. 
In sum, the forgoing analysis points out that the components of the discount rate r for the 
determination of the present value of the GLS at any point of time before maturity are as follows:  
 
r =    + default premium + growth risk premium + novelty premium. 
 
Since the GLS are assumed to be issued in US dollars, the exchange rate risk is relatively 
negligible for foreign investors.  
The discussion thus far carried out shows that the GLS are likely to be priced higher than 
the conventional debt instruments, particularly in the first stage of their introduction to the 
market. However, the opportunities that they offer for a better management of a country debt 
make it worthwhile to pay for the additional costs. The current debt crisis in some countries of 
the European Union proves that, when they occur, debt crises are costly not only for the country 
in question, but also for the investors and the international community.  
Having thus, discussed the economics and the mathematical formulation of the GLS, the next 
step is to discuss few issues that may arise from a Fiqhi perspective. 
3.2. An analysis of the model from Sharī'ah perspective 
3.2.1. Sharī’ah justification of GLS 
Sharī’ah compliance is a necessary condition for any product to be acceptable in Islamic finance. 
Two main aspects of Sharī’ah compliance can be identified:  
- Conformity to the key Sharī’ah rulings pertaining to commercial transactions, such as the 
principle of mutual consent, the prohibition of Ribā, Gharar, Maysir and illicit goods. 
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- Upholding Maqāsid al-Sharī’ah (the objectives of Sharī’ah) in transactions which consist 
of the realization of Maslahah in the outcome and the achievement fairness in the terms 
of the contract
12
. 
Showing the Sharī’ah compliance of the GLS requires, therefore, testing them against the 
elements in the two aforementioned aspects.  
Analyzing the conformity of a product to Sharī’ah principles in the light of the first 
aspect (i.e. key Sharī’ah ruling in commercial transactions) can be carried out in two equivalent 
ways. The analysis can be done indirectly, by showing that the product is in conformity with 
each of the five elements mentioned under that aspect. The analysis can also be done directly by 
proofing that the underlying transaction fits one or a combination of Sharī’ah nominate 
contracts. We adopt the latter method as it appears more convenient.  
Istisnā' would certainly be the most appropriate concept for the development of a non-
revenue generating project. However, the non-tradability of Sukūk Istisnā' makes them less 
attractive as a fund raising instrument in the capital market. On the other hand, a simple Ijārah 
would require the delivery of the asset to justify the rental payment. Forward Ijārah  (Ijārah al-
mawsūfah fī al-dzimah) overcomes this shortcoming and can be taken as the underlying Fiqh 
concept for GLS. This structure allows the Sukūkholders, through their representative, to 
undertake the construction of the project, lease it to the government and receive the payments 
(principal + profit), over the tenor of the project.   
Forward lease is a sale of future benefits or usufructs for a price which can be paid in 
advance or deferred. The concept may be used for infrastructure projects whereby the 
government fully describes the specifications of the infrastructure to be delivered in the future. 
Thus, a SPV can enter into a contract of forward lease with the government for the usufruct of an 
asset to be delivered, and then issues Sukūk for the needed amount. This method is stronger than 
a mere promise to rent which is not binding and its non-fulfillment only implies compensation 
for actual damage (Lahsasna 2010; Abu Ghuddah, (n.d.)). According to Nasar (2009, [2]) 
Forward lease is endorsed by the majority of the Muslim jurists (Mālikīs, Shāfi’īs and Hanbalīs) 
who consider it a form of Salam contract. Thus, the legality of Forward Ijārah is derived from 
that of two basic contracts which are Salam and Ijārah.  
Once the contract is concluded in this stage the delivery of the project as specified is on 
the liability of the Sukūkholders whereas the Government is liable to pay the price K+P (i.e. 
invested capital plus profit). With the forward lease contract, the Sukūk will be tradable in the 
secondary market, once the project starts.  
If the first mode of payment (as in equation (4)) is adopted, then the transfer can be done 
for free at the end of the contract. But if the second mode is adopted (as in equation (5)), then the 
Sukūk are to be redeemed at their nominal value, for instance. AAOIFI (2004a) and Islamic Fiqh 
Academy, in its Resolution No. 110(4/12), have accepted the transfer of ownership through a 
separate contract of gift. AAOIFI has also endorsed the redemption of Sukūk Ijārah for nominal 
value, in its 2008 statement.  
                                                          
12
 See Diaw and Boon Ka (2010) for elaboration. 
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Since Ijārah is a sale of usufruct, the price should be known at the beginning, for 
otherwise there will be Gharar. Nevertheless, it is allowed to have different lease contracts for 
subsequent periods with different rentals agreed upon at the beginning of each contract. For 
instance, a country X may issue GLS in March 2010, with tenor of 5 years and a rental payable 
annually in June, every year. This contract can be considered as a succession of 5 lease contracts 
of one year each. At the beginning of each period, i.e. in March, the contracting parties sign the 
new contract which lasts for one year. The first annual payment would occur in June 2010, based 
on the GDP figure of 2009. Such an arrangement would allow taking into account the usual lag 
for publishing GDP data and the collection of the taxes. 
As for the second aspect of Sharī’ah compliance i.e. upholding the objectives of Sharī’ah 
in transactions, the GLS clearly constitutes a Maslahah. This is because, not only they allow 
deals that benefit the contracting parties but also they do it in a better way than many traditional 
investments. Investment is supposed to support productive activities, however, it is not evident 
that many investments in the stocks market and mutual funds serve the real economy. The GLS, 
as designed above, do. The proceeds from the Sukūk issuance are normally used by the issuer for 
developing infrastructure projects that ultimately add value to the economy. Hence the GLS 
constitute a Maslahah in that their outcomes are beneficial to the society. 
The terms of the contracts in the GLS model are balanced. This is evidenced by its risk 
sharing characteristics. By accepting to have an exposure to the economic performance of the 
issuing country, the Sukūkholders share with it the upside and downside of its economy. Thus, 
the interests of the contracting parties move in the same direction, and that constitutes a form of 
fairness in the terms of the contract.  
3.2.2. The Issue of indexation 
The issue of indexation has, for a long time, drawn the attention of the contemporary Muslim 
scholars as evidenced by the numerous seminars held under the auspice of Islamic Fiqh 
Academy, to discuss the issue. One of the reasons for this particular attention is the fact that with 
the prohibition of Ribā in all its forms, the amount of a debt should remain unchanged even 
though the purchasing power of the currency falls for one reason or another. This could put a 
creditor in an uncomfortable situation. Thus, based on the experts‟ research on the matter, the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy Resolution No. 115 (9/12), states that: 
“In principle debts that have already been created in terms of a certain currency 
should be repaid in terms of that same currency and not in terms of an equivalent 
value, because a debt has always to be settled with its exact similar. It is therefore 
impermissible to link the already existed debts, whatever their source might be, to 
price level” 
Further in the same Resolution, the Academy emphasizes that it is impermissible from a 
Sharī’ah viewpoint to link, at the time of concluding a debt, the repayable amount to variable, 
like gold and silver, growth rate of Gross national Product (GNP), interest rate, price of a basket 
of commodities. The prohibition is due to the presence of a great deal of Gharar and uncertainty 
in that indexation, since neither of the parties knows what will be the commitment at the end.  
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The indexation in the GLS model is, however, different from that one dealt with in the 
Resolution. In the Resolution the condition of the variability of the amount to be repaid is 
contained in the same contract that creates the debt. But in the context of GLS, there is a 
succession of Ijārah contracts and the rental of each is known at the beginning. It is the same 
procedure that is used to link the return in Sukūk Ijārah   to LIBOR. It follows from this basic 
difference that the prohibition in the Resolution does not concern the form of indexation 
practiced with GLS. 
4. GDP-linked Sukūk: Empirical analysis 
The GLS are new model which is not yet introduced to the market. Therefore, it is not possible to 
observe the behavior of their returns. Thus, to test the effectiveness of the model we look into the 
characteristics of the returns by applying backtesting method.  
Thus the simulations permit the study of the behavior of the proposed models under various 
scenarios to unveil their risk-return profiles. They also make it possible to compare their 
hypothetical returns to that of some standard benchmark for debt and equity instruments. With 
the simulations results the diversification opportunities offered by the models are also examined. 
4.1. Backtesting GLS: Method and data 
Backtesting is a method that permits the comparison of the ex ante forecast from a model to the 
actual or ex post realization of the variable of interest. (Christoffersen 2008).  
Backtesting has been used in the academia as well as in the finance industry to detect 
possible flaws in a model and check the consistency of its predicted properties. In risk 
management backtesting has been employed systematically to test the accuracy and efficiency of 
the Value-at-Risk (VaR) models which are extensively used to manage market risk. The Basel 
Committee on banking Supervision (BCBS) has endorsed the use of backtesting in conjunction 
with the internal models approach to determine market risk capital requirements. Thus, the 
backtest help evaluate and validate the model being used internationally by banks in agreement 
with the regulatory body (BCBS 1996; Lehikinen 2007, p.24).  
The objective of the backtesting is to see what would have happened if the GLS were 
issued in some selected developing countries few years back. Thus, five countries from different 
regions of the Muslim world are chosen. These are: Algeria, Bahrain, Malaysia, Senegal and 
Uzbekistan. It is expected to get useful insight from this diversity, given the relative integration 
of economies from a same region. Thus, each of the five countries comes from a different region 
of the Muslim world. Table 1 shows the correlations coefficients between the GDP growth of the 
selected countries and that of their respective regions from 1990 to 2009.  
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Table 1: Correlation Coefficients between GDP Growth rate of the Selected Countries and 
that of their respective regions from 1990 to 2009 
 World North 
Africa 
Middle 
East 
South 
East Asia 
Sub 
Saharan 
Africa
13
 
Former 
Soviet 
Union
14
 
Algeria 0.228 0.607 0.231 -0.324 0.740 0.642 
Bahrain -0.012 -0.241 0.443 0.248 -0.087 -0.028 
Malaysia 0.449 -0.304 0.403 0.969 -0.157 -0.339 
Senegal 0.585 0.506 0.245 -0.094 0.591 0.496 
Uzbekistan 0.204 0.463 0.255 -0.288 0.768 0.909 
 
Except Bahrain, for each of the selected countries the correlation coefficient of the GDP 
growth rate with that of its corresponding region is grater than 0.5.  This strong correlation 
suggests that the results of the backtest obtained from the sample would be valid for the vast 
majority of Muslim countries which are the potential issuers of the GLS. 
The real GDP of the selected countries from 1969 to 2009, in 2005 dollars, are obtained 
from Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. The choice of 
real GDP is explained by the fact that it isolates the effect of inflation on GDP figures and, thus, 
constitutes a more accurate measure of economic performance than the nominal.  We retrieved 
from the internet
15
 the 6-Month LIBOR rates for the specified period, and then computed the 
annual average. The annual returns for the MSCI World are also collected from DataStream. 
MSCI World is a stock market index of 1500 stocks from 23 developed countries. LIBOR and 
MSCI World can be considered as global benchmarks for two asset classes (i.e. debt and equity). 
The correlation coefficients between the countries indices and the annual rates of return for 
LIBOR and MSCI are computed to examine the diversification opportunities that the 
introduction of GLS would provide to those portfolios which are highly correlated to these 2 
benchmarks. 
  
                                                          
13
 Excluding South Africa. 
14
 Excluding Russia and Ukraine.  
15
 www.wsjprimerate.us, accessed on July 11, 2010. 
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The construction of the Annual Returns for each country is as follows: 
i. The Index I, as in equation (2) is first constructed using the GDP data: 
   
  
  
                                              
Where: 
-    is the growth rate of the GDP agreed upon by the contracting parties as baseline in 
year 0. For this backtest, 1995 is taken as year 0 and    represents the moving average 
of the growth rate of the country from 1970 to year k
th. Where 1 ≤  k  ≤ 11, i.e. from 1996 
to 2006. The moving average is of nature to reduce the volatility of the index as 
compared to the normal average, since it also captures the most recent development of 
the GDP. 
-    is the growth rate of the GDP at year kth. 
-    is an index that measures an increase or a decrease of the growth rate of the GDP in 
year k
th
, as compared to that of the baseline.  
Thus,    represents the value of the index in the 5th year, i.e. in 2000, and    the average rate of 
growth from 1970 to 2000. 
ii. The following step is the computation of the Annual Return, based on equation 
(3):                     
                                         
 
-     is the initial rate of profit agreed upon by the parties at the beginning of the 
contract. For the sake of comparability     is set at 5%  which is close to that of 6-
Month LIBOR rate in January 1996.  
-      is the rate of return at the kth   year, after issuance. 
 
4.2. Analysis of the results 
Tables 2, provides a summary statistics for the annual values of the indices and the annual rates 
of returns of the GLS over the 11 years.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for GLS for the period 1996-2006 
 
  
Index (I) 
Average 
Return 
Annual 
average  
6-Month 
LIBOR 
MS 
WRLD$ 
Index 
Average 
Return 
    
Algeria     
Average 0.97 4.87 4.28 8.01 
Std Dev. 0.44 2.19 1.90 17.53 
Bahrain     
Average 1.51 7.57 4.28 8.01 
Std Dev. 0.34 1.69 1.90 17.53 
Malaysia     
Average 0.76 3.80 4.28 8.01 
Std Dev. 0.40 1.99 1.90 17.53 
Senegal     
Average 1.53 7.66 4.28 8.01 
Std Dev. 0.59 2.96 1.90 17.53 
Uzbekistan     
Average 2.79 13.95 4.28 8.01 
Std Dev. 0.83 4.16 1.90 17.53 
 
For 3 countries (Bahrain, Senegal, Uzbekistan), the average value of the Index would 
have been greater than 1 implying higher costs for the issuing countries (but higher return for the 
investors). The highest increase was recorded with Uzbekistan whose average payment 
obligation would have increased by 179%. On the other hand, the lowest average Index is that of 
Malaysia, with a value of 0.76, implying a decrease of 24% of the average payment obligation as 
compared to its initial value. Except Uzbekistan, the average returns and the standard deviations 
of the GLS are less than that of MSCI Index.  
A closer investigation of the reasons for the contrast between the Malaysian scenario and 
that of Uzbekistan corroborates a point that we made earlier pertaining to the variables that 
would have greater impact on the value of the Index or the Annual Return.  By considering the 
average growth rate of these two countries in the two sub-periods before the issuance (i.e. 1970 – 
1995) and after the issuance (i.e. 1996 – 2006), it appears that the two economies evolved in a 
contrasted fashion. For the first sub-period, the average growth rate is 7.4% and 1.6% for 
Malaysia and Uzbekistan respectively, whereas the figures are 4.84% and 4.88% in the second 
sub-period. It is worth noting that Malaysia was hit by a severe financial crisis in 1997 that badly 
affected the economic performance of the country in subsequent years. Whereas, Uzbekistan 
experienced an economic improvement after the dislocation of the Soviet Union to which it 
belonged. Thus, if the changes in the Index for Malaysia are within acceptable limits - as they are 
Center for Islamic Economics and Finance, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Qatar Foundation 
 
20 
 
in line with the economic rationale of the GLS - that is not the case for Uzbekistan which would 
have been overburden due to a poor design of the instrument. It follows from this remark that 
some precautions should be taken when designing the GLS. First, a reasonable forecast of the 
growth prospects of the issuing country is key element for the choice of the baseline growth and 
hence for the avoidance of sharp fluctuations. Second, the setting up of ceiling and floor for 
maximum and minimum payments is also important to avoid the bad effects of wrong forecast or 
inaccurate estimations that may lead to extreme fluctuations.   
For the sake of comparison, the 5-years Malaysian sovereign bonds over the same period 
(i.e. 1996 – 2006) had an average yield of 4.9%, while the average return on the Malaysian 
Global Sukūk, issued in 2002, is 3.93%. both figures are higher than the average return on GLS 
over the period of the study which is 3.8%. This result substantiates the point that GLS is not 
necessarily more expensive than the traditional instruments already in the market. 
The results of the backtest show that, as they are designed, the GLS would satisfy the 
main purpose of their introduction. Thus, Algeria and Malaysia which had economic difficulties 
during the period would have made lower payment and the contrary is true for the other 
countries. 
 
Graph 1: GLS (hypothetical) Annual Returns for the period 1996-2006 
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Graph 1 shows the evolution of the GLS annual returns over the period of study. 
Uzbekistan recorded the highest and most volatile annual return for the whole period, whereas 
Malaysia is the only country which would have not made payment in one occasion (i.e. in 1998, 
after the Asian crisis).  
Between these 2 extremes the remaining GLS annual returns exhibit different behaviors, 
with values that vary within the range of 1% to 11%.  
From the investor perspective, the choice to include the GLS to his portfolio depends 
very much on the diversification opportunities that they provide. To analyze this aspect, we 
follow Schroder et al.(2004) by considering a method of portfolio optimization in the Markowitz 
mean–variance framework. This method indicates that to include a new financial asset A in a 
portfolio P the following equation should hold: 
    
  
 
    
  
                                                  
Where RA and RP are the average returns of A and P; ρA,P , σA ,  and σP represent 
respectively the correlation coefficient and standard deviation of A and P; r is a risk free rate. 
Within this framework, a financial asset is eligible for inclusion to the portfolio if its Sharpe 
Ratio (i.e. the left-hand side of (7)) is greater than the Sharpe Ratio of the portfolio time the 
correlation coefficient of the two (i.e. the right-hand side of (7)). Thus, the value of the 
correlation coefficient is crucial, as, for instance, if the Sharpe Ratio of the portfolio is 2 times 
greater than that of the new asset, the latter could be included to the portfolio if the correlation 
coefficient is less than 0.5.  
This intuitive approach shows, without need to any detailed calculations, that the GLS 
would provide a good avenue for diversification to all the portfolios that are highly correlated to 
LIBOR and MSCI Index, as suggested by the results in Table 3. Indeed, all the correlation 
coefficients are less than 0.4, some having even negative values.  
 
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients between the GLS Annual Returns and Selected 
Benchmarks. 
 Algeria Bahrain Malaysia Senegal Uzbekistan 
Cor. Coef.   
 (I, LIBOR) 
-0.67 -0.60 0.13 0.06 -0.04 
Cor. Coef.   
 (I, MSWRLD$) 
0.34 0.02 0.10 0.38 0.21 
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4.3. Hypothetical example 
A Muslim Country X has an important program for infrastructure development in the next 
decade. Given the illiquidity in the credit market as a consequence of Global Financial Crisis, 
Country X wants to diversify it funding sources and tap the excess liquidity in the GCC 
region by issuing Sukūk. On the other hand, the debt crisis in the Euro zone constituted a 
compelling argument for the government authorities in Country X to fund an important share 
of these infrastructure projects through state-contingent Sukūk (e.g. Commodity-Linked 
Sukūk and GDP-Linked Sukūk). An amount K= $ 1 billion is needed to build schools, 
universities and hospitals in different districts of Country X. Country X decides to raise the 
capital K= $ 1 billion through the issuance of a 10-year GLS, in March 2011 with initial 
annual profit rate of 8% (i.e. the amount of the first year rental = $ 80 million). As the owners 
of the projects, the Sukūkholders will lease the assets (i.e. schools, universities and hospitals) 
to Country X government which will buy them at maturity for $ 1 billion. Based on the 
forecast made by some international financial institutions, Country X GDP growth rate over 
the next ten years has been estimated and the parties agreed on the baseline GDP growth rate. 
Further, the parties agreed to set a ceiling and a floor of 50% up and down of the Index (I)
16
. 
This means that with an initial value of I =1, the maximum and the minimum values that I 
can take are 1.5 and 0.5 respectively. Thus, the various estimated I and the corresponding Cash 
Flow (CFk)
17
are as in the following table: 
 
Table 4: Hypothetical Values of I and CFk for Country X GLS 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
I 1 1.08 0.96 0.79 0.68 0.5 0.73 1.03 1.44 1.5 
CFk ($ 
Mil.) 
80 86.4 76.8 63.2 54.4 40 58.4 82.4 115.2 120 
 
For this type of Sukūk the investors currently require a 7% rate of return. Given that the face 
value of unit of GLS is $ 1,000, Country X needs to evaluate the Present Value (PV) of cash 
flows, to determine the number of units of Sukūk to be issued. Thus we have: 
    
   
       
  
   
 
 
        
                   
To raise the needed fund, the government of Country X has to issue 958847 units of GLS at $ 
1,042.92 per unit. 
                                                          
16
 Based on equation (2). 
17
 Based on equations (5). 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper we made a case for GDP-Linked Sukūk as an effective tool for non revenue 
generating infrastructure projects financing in a Sharī’ah compliant way. The GLS allow the 
synchronization of the payment obligation of the issuing government with its payment ability. 
With the GLS, the investors‟ capital is guaranteed but the profit rate is function of the 
performance of the economy. The theoretical analysis as well as the empirical evidence suggests 
that the returns on the GLS are higher than that on comparable straight bond as the risk is higher 
with the former. However, the results of the simulation suggest the presence of interesting 
diversification opportunities with the GLS. From the issuer perspective, GLS appear more 
expensive than the traditional debt instruments for fund raising, but GLS offer better 
opportunities for debt management. To prevent sharp fluctuations of the profit rate, we propose 
the setting of ceiling and floor for that rate.  
In the Sukūk literature, many writers have complained of the complexity of certain Sukūk 
structures whose construction involves necessarily additional advisory fees compared to the 
standards financial instruments. We claim that the GLS model is simple by design as only one 
Sharī’ah concept is involved. Therefore, the contracting parties do not need to disburse 
exorbitant advisory fees for the construction and the endorsement of the structures. If we add to 
this characteristic the tradability of GLS and its adherence to Sharī'ah principles, we reach the 
conclusion that the model is efficient in both technical and allocative sense, as defined above.  
Kamstra and Shiller (2009) maintained that there is a trade off, in debt management, 
between low cost but volatile short-term debt and higher cost but more stable long-term debt. A 
government will certainly be concerned with the risk of a sharp increase of the cost of debt 
servicing during economic down turn when its budget can least afford it. They, thus, made a case 
for diversifying government obligations to reduce the budget crisis even though it means higher 
average cost for fund raising. The current debt crisis in Europe gives credit to this argument. 
Financial instruments like GLS offer Muslim governments the opportunity to diversify their fund 
raising and address the issue of benchmarking the Sukūk against the interest rate. GLS would 
also be a suitable instrument to be used by institutions like Islamic Development Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank to finance projects in Muslim countries. 
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,   0430جَادي الآخزة  00-10اىَْعقذة في جذة ) عزض و تقىيٌ: اىصنىك الإسلاٍيت(بحىث ّذوة  ]1[
باىتعاوُ بيِ ٍزمز أبحاث الإقتصاد الإسلاٍي و ٍجَع اىفقه , ً 2024ٍايى  24 – 24اىَىافق 
واىَعهذ الإسلاٍي ىيبحىث واىتذريب عضى , الإسلاٍي اىذوىي اىتابع ىَْظَت اىَؤتَز الإسلاٍي
 .ٍجَىعت اىبْل الإسلاٍي ىيتَْيت
فقه الإجارة اىَىصىفت في اىذٍت و تطبيقاتها في اىَْتجاث اىَاىيت ). 2224(أحَذ ٍحَذ ٍحَىد ّصار  ]2[
اىَْعقذ ٍؤتَز اىَصارف الإسلاٍيت بيِ اىىاقع واىَأٍىه بحج ٍقذً إىً . الإسلاٍيت ىتَىيو اىخذٍاث
 .في دبي
